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Advertising plays a key role in our
economy and, in particular in the food
system. Many articles have appeared in
both the academic and the business press
regarding the benefits of advertising and
promotion to the individual firm. This
paper will take a more macro approach in
discussing the impact of advertising on
the efficiency of the food manufacturing
sector since much of the current activity
in food advertising can be attributed to
these firms, Implications of advertising
on the competitive environment and on
other firms in the food distribution sys-
tem will be discussed.
Food manufacturers spent an estimated
$4 billion on advertising and promotion
in 1977. By comparison with other indus-
tries, the food manufacturing industries
are perennial leaders, accounting for 25
percent of the total advertising expendi-
tures by all manufacturing industries
(Table 1). While various methods are used
in advertising and promoting food prod-
ucts, including point of purchase, direct
mail, etc., the most widely used method
1 Over one-half of is media advertising.
the total advertising budgets of manufac-
turers have normally been set aside for
media advertising.
The various media are not necessar-
ily perfect substitutes, however, as
television apparently is regarded as the
most effective media. For the food in-
dustries as a whole, the share of media
expenditures devoted to television ranged
from 53 to 58 percent in recent years.
Large firms, however, rely more heavily
on television than do smaller firms. Of
the 100 leading advertisers of 1977 iden-
tified by Advertising Age, 48 were food
manufacturers,L If one looks at the 25
largest advertisers who were also food
manufacturers (and excluding those whose
major products are forbidden from tele-
vision advertisements) the share of ad-
vertising devoted to television ranges
from 43 to 98 percent with a median of
83 percent (Table 2).
Food advertising is not uniformly
distributed among firms by either size or
type of firm. Large firms, especially
those with over $250 million in assets,
accounted for over 60 percent of the ad-
vertising in 1971 (6). Not only is a
large share of food advertising attri-
buted to the larger firms, but they also
devote a larger share of their sales dol-
lars to advertising, 3.7 percent, compared
to the 2.3 percent industry average. This
is somewhat surprising in view of econ-
omies of size considerations. Spending
nearly four percent of the sales dollar
on advertising may at first seem to be
an insignificant expenditure, but the
expenditure takes an added significance,
however, in relation to the earnings/sales
ratio of 4.7 for the 25 leading food ad-
vertisers (2).
The preceding suggested that adver-
tising expenditures are concentrated
among the larger firms. Closer examin-
ation reveals that a few large companies
account for a large share of the food




Total manufacturing $5,993 $8,286 $10,474
Food and Kindred products 1,637 2,031 2,532
Tobacco 317 363 398
Apparel and other fabricated
textiles 126 170 207
Furniture and fixtures 62 72 105
Chemicals and allied products 1,350 1,929 2,476
Petroleum 222 321 392
Primary metals 106 140 143
Motor vehicles 205 520 567
Source: Statistics of Income, Corporation Income Tax Returns, Department of Treasury,
Internal Revenue Service.
Table 2. Measured Media Food and Nonfood Advertising Expenditures of 25 Leading
Food Manufacturers, 1977
Measured Media Television as
Measured Media as Percent of Percent of
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Measured Media Television as
Measured Media as Percent of Percent of


































Reprinted with permission from the August 28, 1978 issue of Advertising Age.
Copyright 1978 by Crain Communications, Inc.
industry’s advertising. Four large food
manufacturers accounted for over one-
fifth of the measured media advertising
of food products in 1976 (Table 3) with
the eight largest totaling one-third.
The largest advertiser of food, General
Foods , alone accounts for 10 percent of
all measured media food advertising. If
one looks at the concentration of food
advertising in network television, the
results are even more dramatic. Four
firms did one-third of the network tele-
vision of food advertising in 1976, and
twelve firms did nearly 60 percent (Table
4). Again, General Foods lead the group
with 16 percent of the network television
expenditures for food. All of the lead-
ing advertisers in Tables 3 and 4 are
diversified firms, One conclusion from
these data is that the concentration
levels remained virtually unchanged from
1967 to 1976, but this is overshadowed
by the very large share of advertising
which is consistently held by the lead-
ing food advertisers.
Regarding type of firm, several ad-
vantages could be postulated which a
conglomerate, diversified firm would
have in its advertising program over a
specialized firm (6). For example, a
large diversified firm may well have an
advantage in acquiring large blocks of
prime-time network television which can
be spread over several different prod-
ucts or brands. Of the 46 firms manu-
facturing or distributing food found on
the Advertising Age list of 100 leading
advertisers, all but seven are diversi-
fied firms (Table 5).3 In 1973, the
median advertising/sales ratio for these
46 firms was 4.4 percent and the un-
weighed mean was 5.4 percent. This
compares with the industry mean of 2.3
percent in 1971 (1,16).
Implications to Competitive
Environment
Economic theory suggests that the
efficiency of a firm or market is related
to the level of competition. The merger-
diversification-advertising trend may
carry implications relative to competi-
tion and market power within the food
manufacturing and distribution system.
First, it is possible for a smaller, non-
diversified firm to be at a competitive
disadvantage when competing with a large
diversified firm--where both are compet-
ing as buyers or as sellers or where one
is a buyer and the other a seller. In
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Journal of Food Distribution ResearchTable 4. Concentration of Network Television Advertising of Food by Leading
Food Manufacturers, 1967 and 1976
Firm Expenditures Share Firm Expenditures Share
(thousands) (%) (thousands) (%)
General Foods $43,153 13.13
General Mills 26,715 8.13
Kellogg 24,285 7.39
Carnation 13,340 4.06
Top 4 totals 106,493 32.71
Kraft Co 12,887 3.92
Pepsi Co 11,677 3.55
Procter & Gamble 11,150 3,39
Campbell Soup 9,644 2.93
Second 4 totals 45,358 13,79
Top 8 totals 151,851 46,50
Quaker Oats 9,580 2,91
Nabisco 9,346 2.84
Standard Brands 7,604 2.31
Lever Bros, 7,540 2.29
Third 4 totals 34,070 10.35
Top 12 totals 185,921 56.85



































Table 5. Total Advertising of Food and Nonfood Products as a Percent of Sales for
Leading Food Manufacturers, 1973-1977
Advertising as Percent of Sales
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Advertising as Percent of Sales




Int’1 Tel. & Tel. Corp. 1.9




Coca Cola Co. 3.5
Pillsbury Co. 5.0
American Brands 1.9








H. J. Heinz Co. 1.8
Esmark, Inc.
Quaker Oats Co. 2.6
Campbell Soup Co. 3.7
Borden, Inc.
Jos. Schlitz Brewing 3.9
CPC Int. 4.0
Mars, Inc. 12.3







Wm, Wrigley, Jr. Co. 12.1
Reprinted with permission from the August 28, 1978, August 29, 1977, August 23, 1976,
August 18, 1975, and August 26, 1974 issues of Advertising Age. Copyrights 1978,
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smaller rival may well face a competi-
tive disadvantage with respect to financ-
ing a large advertising budget or gain-
ing favored media time or space (e.g.,
prime time network television). While
this opportunity may not be closed in all
cases, the competitive advantage may be
with the diversified advertiser. Addi-
tional data on both advertising and
production or consumption would be re-
quired in order to determine whether such
advantage exists. This is usually not
possible on a cross-sectional basis, but
is possible more often as a case study.
One such example, combining both the role
of a diversified, merger active firm and
the influence of advertising is the brew-
ing industry. In this industry, the
forces of diversification, merger, and
advertising have converged and will likely
result in a dramatic restructuring of
the industry.
Until recently, the brewing indus-
try was noted as an industry comprised
of specialized, independently owned
firms. The acquisition of the Miller
Brewing Company, the seventh largest
brewer, first by W, R. Grace and later by
Philip Morris introduced a new competi-
tive dimension into the industry. Philip
Morris, with its large resource base and
marketing expertise has used advertising
as the major device for bringing Miller
into industry prominence (9,12,13).
Media advertising expenditures increased
from $10.9 million in 1970 to over $43
million in 1977 (11). Unit costs of ad-
vertising reached a peak of $2.59 per
barrel in 1971, far ahead of that of the
industry leaders, Anheuser-Busch and
Schlitz, at $0.98 and $1.03 respectively
(l). The costs have been high, and could
only be afforded by having a diversified
parent firm to cross-subsidize the firm
through the advertising budget (5,13).
In six years, Miller has climbed
from the seventh to the second largest
brewer. Consumption of Miller products
increased 370 percent from 1970 through
1977 while consumption of the remaining
twelve largest brewers increased by only
46 percent (1,3).
The gains to Miller have not been
without costs to the industry. While
all changes in the structure of the in-
dustry should not be attributed solely
to Miller, the nature and level of com-
petition instituted by Miller seems to
be largely responsible. First, if the
present trend continued, it is quite
likely that the industry will be restruc-
tured quite dramatically, with the four
leading brewers increasing market share
from 51 percent in 1972 to 71 percent by
1980 (Table 6). Those firms who have
the resource base have countered the
Miller challenge with additional adver-
tising. But most projections suggest
that (other than Miller) only Anheuser-
-Buschwill reach 1980 with an increased
market share. Schlitz and Pabst, at
best, may be able to maintain their cur-
rent market shares. This is quite the
opposite result from that predicted in a
study of the industry in the mid 1960’s:
11
. . . it appears unlikely that con-
centration in the brewing indus-
try at least with regard to the
leading five firms, will increase
to any great extent in the near
future, though we might anti-
cipate that concentration for
the leading 25 firms will enjoy
appreciable gains’’.
Second, additional restructuring is
likely, particularly through the acquisi-
tion of other leading brewers by diversi-
fied firms, Some leading brewers have
already indicated their interest in find-
ing a diversified, parent firm to provide
them the financial resources to ward off
further inroads by Miller. Third, the
product differentiation-advertising
strategy pursued by Philip Morris/Miller
has most likely increased the industry’s
marketing costs. In response to the
Miller challenge, 12 of the 14 largest
brewers increased their media advertising




Four largest 51% 71%
Fifth through
twelfth largest 39% 27%
All others 10% 2%
Source: Sanford C. Bern=in & Company,
Brewiny Industry Review,
December 1977, p. 30 and Willard
F, Mueller, Testimony before
Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly, Committee on the Judi-
ciary, U.S. Senate.
expenditures in 1977. As a group (and
excluding Miller) their 1977 advertising
expenditures increased 34 percent over
1976, yet production levels increased
only 7 percent. Advertising cost per
barrel consequently increased from $0.94
to $1.34, a 43 percent increase (3). The
increased marketing costs of these firms
in all likelihood represents an increase
in total costs to the firms since most
of these firms are of sufficient size
that production economies are only slight
or have already been exhausted (7,13).
Fourth, it would be a myopic view to
conclude that what has happened in the
brewing industry has no relevance to the
rest of the food manufacturing industries.
The recent acquisitions of Green Giant
by Pillsbury and of Del Monte by R. J.
Reynolds, added to the Hunt Foods con-
solidated into Norton-Simon a few years
ago and the acquisition of Libby by the
Nestle Enterprises is another example of
an industry previously dominated by
specialized firms coming under the con-
trol of conglomerate enterprise.
Implications to Food Distributors
Implications of the trends in
mergers, diversification, and advertising
to food wholesalers and retailers should
be noted. First, will the trends result
in an added marketing cost to the sys-
tem? As in the case with trading stamps,
there are short-run advantages to the
initiator of a new method of competition,
but the advantage can disappear in the
long run. With trading stamps, the
first few that initiated the practice
could expect an increase in sales suf-
ficiently large to offset the added cost
of issuing the stamps. But as most other
firms in the market duplicate the action,
the initiator’s advantage disappears into
an added cost to the market system. Will
this also be the end result in those
industries where a diversified firm
enters through merger and attempts to
gain added market share through an adver-
tising cross-subsidy? The Philip Morris-
Miller example and others suggest this
may be true, and if so, confirming the
hypotheses of conglomerate growth sug-
gested by both Edwards (6) and Narver
(14). Preliminary research results at
the University of Kentucky on 68 acquisi-
tions of food manufacturers between 1965
and 1972 tentatively suggest that the
cross-subsidization hypothesis is valid.
There are several brands which, following
acquisition, have become a leading ad-
vertised brand and, in some cases, a
leading consumed brand.
Second, what will be the effect on
consumer choice and on consumer sover-
eignty? Regarding the former, one goal
of the food manufacturer appears to be in
gaining market share through intense ad-
vertising which develops a “demand-pull”
for their products on the part of con-
sumers. This could be a response by
manufacturers to private labeling by re-
tailers and to the struggle for shelf
space. Thus consumers, who previously
may have been price conscious, or at least
somewhat indifferent regarding brands,
may develop a preference for a given ad-
vertised brand. Implications to a re-
tailer, especially one promoting private
labels, are obvious,
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gested that the large expenditures on
advertising by firms selling to consumers
may be influencing consumer buying deci-
sions to such an extent that it is the
producer, and not the consumer, who is
sovereign (8). Whether there have been
shifts in consumption due to advertising
expenditures is speculative at this
point. Clearly, the most highly processed
food products receive a significantly
larger share of media advertising dollars
than do the more basic commodity foods
(15). The present data based, however,
is not sufficient to test for actual
shifts in consumption except in special
cases (e.g., brewing) where consumption
data are available by brand,
Finally, what are the possible
implications of the trends noted above
regarding the relative market power of
manufacturers and retailers? To a few,
large national chains, who themselves
are integrated into manufacturing, the
implications may be quite limited.
Regional and local chains, however, may
find themselves at a competitive disadvan-
tage as they face fewer sellers who are
also selling a larger share of the food
products needed by the retailer. The
market power implications were probably
best summarized by Mueller in reference
to the Philip Morris-Miller merger when
he stated that the end result of the
merger is “the inexorable trend toward
shared monopoly in which price competi-
tion is replaced by escala~ing promotional
competition and ultimately higher prices;
an environment in which survival and
success is dictated by market power, not
efficiency; the demise of most regional
and local brewers and the weakening of
some major brewers as effective competi-
tors” (12).
FOOTNOTES
1Media advertising includes network and
spot television, network and spot radio,
newspapers and newspaper supplements,
magazines, and outdoor.
2
A firm was defined to be a food manu-
facturer if it had annual sales of food
products of at least $200 million and
with the food sales accounting for a
minimum of 10 percent of firm sales.
3A firm was classified as diversified if
less than 70 percent of its sales came
from a single 3 digit SIC industry group
based on firm diversification data found
in Connor and Mather (4). If more than
70 percent came from a single 3-digit










Advertising Age, November 3, 1975.
Advertising Age, August 28, 1978.
Advertising Age, November 9, 1978.
John M. Connor and Loys L, Mather,
Directory of the 200 Largest U.S.
Food and Tobacco Processing Firms
1975 (joint publication: ESCS-US
~rtment of Agriculture and North
Central Regional Project NC-117)
July 1978.
William Coors, quoted in Beer Mar-
keters Insights, June 1, 1976.
Corwin D. Edwards, “Conglomerate Big-
ness as a Source of Power” in Bus-
iness Concentration and Price Policy,
Conference Proceedings of the National
Bureau of Economic Research (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press,
1955).
Kenneth G. Elzinga, “The Beer Indus-
try,” in Adams (Ed.), The Structure
of American Industry (New York:
McMillan Publishing Company, Inc.)
1977.
Journal of Food Distribution Research February 79/page 998. J. K. Galbraith, “Economics as a
System of Belief,” American Economic
Review, May 1970.
9. M. G, Hofkin, A Perspective Piece on
the Major Brews, Robert W. Baird &
Company, March 1976.
10. Ira Horowitz and Ann R. Horowitz,
“Firms in a Declining Market: The
Brewing Case,” Journal of Industrial
Economics, March 1965.
11, Leading National Advertisers, Inc.
Company/Brand $, December 1977, Vol.
4, No. 4.
12. Miller Times, Vol. 2, Issue 2,
April-June 1976.
February 79/page 100
13. Willard F. Mueller, Testimony
before Hearings on Conglomerate
Mergers, Subcommittee on ktitrust
and Monopoly, Committee on the Jud-
iciary, U.S. Senate, May 12, 1978.
14. John C. Narver, Conglomerate Mergers
and Market Competition (Berkeley:
University of California Press,
1969).
15. Mark Reese, The Influence of Adver-
tising on Consumption of Selected
Food Products, M.S. Degree Thesis
(in process) University of Kentucky.
16. Sourcebook, Statistics of Income,
Corporation Income Tax Returns,
U.S. Treasury Department, Internal
Revenue Service.
Journal of Food Distribution Research